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Abstract 
This article addresses computational procedures that are no longer constrained by human 
modes of representation and considers how these procedures could be philosophically 
understood in terms of ‘algorithmic thought’. Research in deep learning is its case study. This 
artificial intelligence (AI) technique operates in computational ways that are often opaque. 
Such a black-box character demands rethinking the abstractive operations of deep learning. 
The article does so by entering debates about explainability in AI and assessing how 
technoscience and technoculture tackle the possibility to ‘re-present’ the algorithmic 
procedures of feature extraction and feature learning to the human mind. The article thus 
mobilises the notion of incommensurability (originally developed in the philosophy of science) 
to address explainability as a communicational and representational issue, which challenges 
phenomenological and existential modes of comparison between human and algorithmic 
‘thinking’ operations. 
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Beyond Human Representation 
 
The success of the Google-owned artificial intelligence (AI) company DeepMind and its 
computer program AlphaGo is well known. In March 2016, AlphaGo defeated the 18-time world 
champion Lee Sedol at Go, an ancient, complex game that involves moving black and white 
stones on a board to control territory. The victory was widely reported by news outlets, with 
commentators drawing parallels with the famous 1997 chess match between the grandmaster 
Garry Kasparov and the IBM supercomputer Deep Blue. The performance of DeepMind’s 
AlphaGo, however, is considered more striking than that of its IBM predecessor, as the board 
game Go involves many more possible moves than chess. Go also requires strategic skills that 
are more intuitive than those useful in a chess game, and which are therefore less 
mechanisable. 1  In this respect, AlphaGo’s victory also made headlines because it 
demonstrated the potential of the type of AI technology that DeepMind champions: machine 
learning. This expression denotes computing techniques that provide computer programs with 
the ability to improve over time with minimal human intervention when exposed to large 
                                               
1 In Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus, the two board games are 
compared philosophically. ‘Chess’, Deleuze and Guattari wrote, ‘is a game of State’; its pieces 
‘have an internal nature and intrinsic properties from which their movements, situations, and 
confrontations derive.’ The pieces in Go, in contrast, are ‘pellets, disks, simple arithmetic units, 
and only have an anonymous, collective, third-person function’; they have ‘no intrinsic 
proprieties, only situational ones’ (2004: 389). 
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amounts of data. The same programs subsequently apply this ‘learning’ to make data-driven 
decisions. 
 While AlphaGo’s success is well known, the story of DeepMind’s 2017 cognate 
program AlphaGo Zero is less familiar to the general public. AlphaGo learned to play Go by 
being exposed to training data derived from millions of moves of past players. AlphaGo Zero, 
in contrast, was not given data from games played by humans or machines but was trained by 
playing against itself, starting from random moves and knowing nothing about the game of Go. 
This feat of solid and stable reinforcement learning amazed the AI community, which 
welcomed AlphaGo Zero as a significant achievement.2 DeepMind proposed a self-taught AI 
program that can train itself from scratch, being de facto ‘no longer constrained by the limits of 
human knowledge’, as DeepMind put it (see Hassabis and Silver, 2017). Whereas AlphaGo 
took months to learn how to play, AlphaGo Zero took just a few days, less computing power 
and a streamlined architecture to master the game, quickly reaching levels of ‘superhuman 
performance’ (Silver et al., 2017: 354). 
 The ability of a program to self-train without the input of human data is a key step 
towards achieving the holy grail of AI research: artificial general intelligence. This is the 
capacity of a machine to perform a breadth of cognitive tasks like that of a person. Recognising 
this, DeepMind is keen ‘to make some real progress on some real problems’ (Hassabis, quoted 
in Gibney, 2017) and extend its success to areas with practical applications (e.g. material 
design, genomics and drug discovery). Central to this possibility is acknowledging that being 
‘no longer constrained by the limits of human knowledge’ means that AlphaGo Zero won not 
by out-reading humans but ‘by seeing patterns and shapes more deeply’, as Andy Okun — the 
president of the American Go Association — observed (quoted in Sample, 2017). In other 
words, AlphaGo Zero succeeded not because it behaved like a human player but because it 
played differently from a human. This condition is particularly interesting from both 
philosophical and sociocultural perspectives: in my view, cases such as AlphaGo Zero allow 
us to say that contemporary developments in cognitive computing are departing from what, in 
a previous work, I called the simulative paradigm, which has been looming over AI research 
since Alan Turing’s proposition of an ‘imitation game’ (Turing, 1950) to test the cognitive 
capabilities of an artificial system. In that work, I claimed that we should conceive of ‘automated 
modes of thought in such a way as to supersede the hope that machines might replicate human 
cognitive faculties, and to thereby acknowledge a form of onto-epistemological autonomy in 
automated “thinking” processes’ (Fazi, 2019a: 813). I thus argued for the possibility of 
considering the algorithmic modes of thought of computing machines as ‘dramatically alien to 
human thought’ (Fazi, 2019a: 813). This article continues developing that line of argumentation 
and focuses on algorithmic modes of cognition, thus maintaining a philosophical commitment 
to ontological and epistemological questions about the nature of thinking in the 21st century. 
More specifically, I here consider algorithmic thought (what it might be and might do) by 
engaging with some theoretical implications of a computer program being ‘no longer 
constrained by the limits of human knowledge’, as DeepMind claimed AlphaGo Zero to be. I 
do not simply repeat what the AI industry says about itself and its products, however; I instead 
critically address these claims to assess their philosophical consequences by interpreting this 
declared freedom from human knowledge as a form of autonomy from human modes of 
abstraction and by relating these issues to questions about representation.3 
                                               
2 Alpaydin explains that reinforcement learning ‘is also known as learning with a critic. The 
agent takes a sequence of actions and receives a reward/penalty only at the very end, with no 
feedback during the intermediate actions. Using this limited information, the agent should learn 
to generate the actions to maximize the reward in later trials’ (2016: 180). 
3 I use the term ‘representation’ not despite but because of debates about its crisis in science, 
art and philosophy (for an overview of some of these discussions, see Nöth, 2003). I do so to 
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 This article thus continues to develop my theorisation of algorithmic thought by 
addressing the contemporary expansion of automated modes of abstraction that operate via 
what computer science calls representation learning. As the computer scientist Yoshua Bengio 
has put it, the central principle of machine-learning methodologies is ‘the automated discovery 
of abstraction’ (2013: 3). ‘Representation learning’, LeCun, Bengio and Hinton explain, ‘is a 
set of methods that allows a machine to be fed with raw data to automatically discover the 
representations needed for detection or classification’ (2015: 436). In this article, I focus on 
precisely this aspect of current developments in AI technologies: how the extraction and 
organisation of ‘discriminative information from the data’ (Bengio, 2013: 2) that these 
technologies perform is specific to their computational character and how it consequently 
transcends or is independent of human access. I thus consider the 21st-century development 
of computational procedures for which, at present, no adequate human cognitive 
representations exist and for which, significantly, human cognitive representations are also 
unnecessary. 
 
Black Boxes of Decision-Making 
 
Research in machine learning is at the forefront of the agenda of AI and data science. As an 
umbrella term, ‘machine learning’ denotes not a single computational technique but a plethora 
of often quite different tools and approaches to cognitive computing. These approaches have 
been grouped together under this label because they all involve algorithms that can ‘learn from 
experience’ insofar as they can change their operations to better fit the requirements of their 
tasks. These requirements are specified in the data that these algorithms must handle. 
‘Machine learning automates automation itself’ (Domingos, 2015: 9–10), for ‘computers can 
learn programs that people can’t write’ (Domingos, 2015: 6). Machine learning thus involves ‘a 
change in programming practice’ as well as in ‘the programmability of machines’ (Mackenzie, 
2018: 21). This condition has been described as a ‘quiet revolution’ (Alpaydin, 2016: ix), as a 
new season after a long and harsh winter in AI research, and as a computational renaissance 
precipitated by a novel form of AI that in fact draws from old cybernetic ideas.4 
 Since there are many machine-learning techniques and many devices that successfully 
implement them, it is important to clarify that deep learning is the approach followed by both 
AlphaGo and AlphaGo Zero, and the method that Google’s DeepMind echoes in its own name. 
Deep learning is itself a remarkably multifaceted technique. To simplify, an artificial neural-
network system relies on layers of artificial neurons to process information. These layers of 
artificial neurons are connected and influence each other in a complex web of interacting units, 
somewhat like biological neurons are understood to do in a biological brain. A lower layer of 
neurons performs a computation and transmits this result to the layer above, enriching the final 
outcome of the layer at the top. What is obtained in each layer is a new representation, ‘which 
can be used as input for deeper layers’ (Bengio, 2013: 4). A neural network is said to learn, 
then, because it can tweak its calculations and modify its interactions by tuning parameters via 
activation and back-propagation among layers until the desired output (i.e. the desired final 
                                               
point to a renewed engagement with questions about the possibility (or impossibility) of 
representing. Moreover, I am speaking of representation because it ‘lies at the heart of the 
debate between the logic-inspired and the neural-network-inspired paradigms for cognition’ 
(LeCun et al., 2015: 441). 
4 The first model of an artificial neuron was published by Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts 
(1943), while the first general definition of machine learning was made by Arthur Samuel 
(1959). In 1957, Frank Rosenblatt (1962) developed the perceptron, an electronic device that 
implemented a simplified model of a biological neuron for pattern recognition. For an account 
of the development of deep learning, see Schmidhuber (2015). 
 
 
M. B. Fazi – Accepted Author Manuscript (2020) 
“Beyond Human: Deep Learning, Explainability and Representation” 
Forthcoming Article in Theory, Culture & Society (SAGE) 
 
4 
representation) is produced. The network, however, is called deep if its structure encompasses 
intermediary ‘hidden’ layers between the input and the output.5 The architecture of a deep-
learning system differs from that of a standard artificial neural network precisely because of 
the presence of these multiple non-linear hidden layers. 
 Deep techniques are often discussed, as they promise to accelerate the computational 
automation of today and fuel the digital transformations of tomorrow. Although artificial neural 
networks have been around for decades (they are a core technology of connectionism, a 
biologically inspired approach to AI that emerged in the 1980s), it is only in the past decade, 
thanks to the volume, velocity and variety (see Beyer and Laney, 2012) of Big Data and the 
increase in computational power, that AI research and industry have begun to capitalise on 
artificial neural networks’ potential. Computational problems that the AI community thought 
could not be tackled for many years — such as recognising speech and other intricate patterns 
in high-dimensional data — are now being significantly improved. Beyond reports on its 
promising results (and the hype about its achievements) that have appeared both in 
specialised literature and the mainstream media, deep learning has also caught popular 
attention in a less flattering light. Because of how a deep neural network operates, relying on 
hidden neural layers sandwiched between the first layer of neurons (the input layer) and the 
last layer (the output layer), deep-learning techniques are often opaque or illegible even to the 
programmers that originally set them up. While ‘different machine learning models provide 
different levels of interpretability with regard to how they reach a specific decision’, it is thus 
commented that deep neural networks ‘are possibly the least interpretable’ (Kelleher, 2019: 
245). In this sense, deep-learning programs are said to be black boxes: it is clear that they 
work but often is not equally clear how or why. 
 In computing and engineering, the expression ‘black box’ is borrowed from cybernetics 
and used to describe an object or a system that is viewed uniquely in terms of its inputs and 
outputs, and whose internal working therefore remains concealed. When approaching a black 
box, one is interested only in stimuli and responses; one considers what goes in and what 
comes out of the black box, not its inner components or operations. While some computer and 
data scientists might take issue with the popular claim that deep-learning systems are black 
boxes,6 there remains the fact that, once a deep neural network is trained (or self-trained, as 
in the case of AlphaGo Zero), it can be extremely difficult to explain why it gives a particular 
                                               
5 In 1986, David Rumelhart, Geoffrey Hinton and Ronald Williams presented experimental 
evidence of the usefulness of the hidden dimension of artificial neural networks’ back-
propagation algorithms. In the journal Nature, they wrote: ‘We describe a new learning 
procedure, back-propagation, for networks of neurone-like units. The procedure repeatedly 
adjusts the weights of the connections in the network so as to minimize a measure of the 
difference between the actual output vector of the net and the desired output vector. As a result 
of the weight adjustments, internal “hidden” units which are not part of the input or output come 
to represent important features of the task domain, and the regularities in the task are captured 
by the interactions of these units. The ability to create useful new features distinguishes back-
propagation from earlier, simpler methods such as the perceptron-convergence procedure’ 
(1986: 533; see also LeCun et al.,1998b). 
6  For instance, parts of computer and data science stress that, at present, deep neural 
networks are often embedded within more traditional software, the main algorithmic 
architecture and strategy of which are known; it is also emphasised that the performance of 
deep learning can be at least partially understood at a theoretical level precisely because of 
this composite character of contemporary machine-learning systems. The AlphaGo Zero case 
itself exemplifies this point insofar as the deep-learning element of the program focuses on 
calculating two central functions of the system (the expert policy and the value approximation 
function). See Silver et al. (2017). 
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response to some data inputs and how a result has been calculated. The strength of a deep 
neural network lies in its capacity to find non-linear patterns in large datasets and improve this 
extraction through iterative interactions. The other side of the coin, however, is that the 
automated learning choices of a deep neural network are not yet fully understood by 
programmers. The knowledge generated in these models remains, in part, implicit due to the 
non-linear nature of deep learning, its compressed information, and the distributed character 
of the network’s representations, which rely on the many configurations of its large sets of 
variables. Such a complex, layered architecture entails difficulty in analytically comprehending 
what nodes and layers have learned and how they have interacted to transform a 
representation at one level into another representation at a higher, more abstract step. 
Moreover, interpretability is not a standard feature of deep learning also because of the 
difficulty of producing a satisfactory mathematical theory as a foundation for these 
architectures. Interestingly, what makes deep techniques powerful also often makes their 
theoretical underpinning tentative. Progress comprehending these computational activities is 
achieved by trial and error, and operations are often rationalised retrospectively. To put this 
otherwise, ‘many algorithms using artificial neural networks are understood only at a heuristic 
level, where [scientists] empirically know that certain training protocols employing large data 
sets will result in excellent performance’ (Lin et al., 2017: 1223).7 
 The trope of the black box is a recurring one in the sociology of science and in science 
and technology studies. Famously, Bruno Latour (1987) described parts of science that have 
been accepted and are no longer controversial as black boxes. Science, for Latour, can 
become a black box when its inner workings are no longer open for scrutiny or debate, when 
consensus has been reached about certain results, when the success of a theory or a method 
obscures how scientific and technical work operates, and when a hypothesis is settled as a 
matter of fact. So, paradoxically, ‘the more science and technology succeed, the more opaque 
and obscure they become’ (Latour, 1999: 304). Always within the diverse domain of the 
sociology of knowledge, social constructivist positions — such as the social construction of 
technology (or SCOT) — stress the need to ‘open the black box’ to recognise the interpretive 
flexibility of an artefact while also crediting ‘users as agents of technological change’ (Kline 
and Pinch, 1999: 113). Opening the black box thus involves counteracting the closure 
mechanisms that ‘play a part in bringing about both scientific agreement and the stabilization 
of an artefact’ (Pinch and Bijker, 1984: 425). 
 Considering deep neural networks, concerns about AI as a black-box technology in 
part recall these earlier debates in science studies yet also transcend them. The black-box 
character of deep-learning techniques is, first of all, a technical condition. Of course, these 
techniques are part of the contemporary world, and their predictions, classification and 
clustering impact the everyday lives of millions of people; with respect to this impact, a social 
constructivist perspective proves useful to explain the concurrent yet multidirectional 
involvements of relevant social groups and the values and interests that inform their 
participation. However, if opening the black box means asking ‘how technology is made’ — to 
paraphrase the title of a famous essay in social constructivist technology studies by Bijker 
(2010) — then, while doing so, we cannot avoid addressing the ontological and epistemological 
specificities of that same technology.8 In the case of deep learning (and machine learning, 
                                               
7 Whether deep learning needs a mathematical foundation is still debated; it is generally 
agreed, however, that mathematical justifications for deep learning’s success remain elusive. 
New paradigms of mathematical reasoning are thus sought as well as new modes of analysis 
(see, for instance, the work of Sanjeev Arora at Princeton University). 
8 In arguing this, I diverge from Bijker’s claim (2010) that the technical and political question 
‘How to make technology?’ can be answered by bracketing the philosophical question ‘What 
is technology?’ 
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more generally), my proposition is that we should not overlook the computational and 
increasingly autonomous character of these technologies. 
 Insofar as they are computational, these are calculative techniques that involve 
quantifying and systematising the real world through discrete functions. Above all, since they 
are computational, deep-learning methods involve decision-making. In a computational 
context, decision-making is the mechanised process that results in the selection of a particular 
result or output among possible alternatives. This decisional capacity of computational 
systems is inscribed in the definition of an algorithmic procedure: a step-by-step ‘effective’ 
method to address a problem that can be posed as a yes-or-no question of input values 
(Turing, 1936). In addition, however, it is crucial to consider how deep learning algorithms are 
also increasingly autonomous artificial actors (see Fazi, 2019b), requiring little engineering by 
hand. In these learned (not designed) systems, transparency is a matter of accountability vis-
à-vis their automated and quasi-autonomous decision-making capacities, which have been 
transferred from humans to the AI system. Thus, while all technologies are black boxes to an 
extent (even a door handle can be approached as one because knowledge of its inner working 
is not necessary to open a door), the consequences of the black-box character of deep learning 
are different because, in this case, it is agency itself (that is, the capacity of the technological 
system to operate upon its environment) that is opaque.9 
 The decision-making of quasi-autonomous artificial agents powered by deep learning 
affects millions of people every day. The range of decisions covered by deep learning is vast. 
It pertains to mechanisms of classification, clustering, ranking and pattern-finding, which are 
employed, for instance, in credit card fraud detection, spam filters, search engines, market 
segmentation, social media advertising, insurance and credit scoring, healthcare 
management, transport and logistics, loan qualification and mobile communication. These and 
other operations were often determined by humans in the past; today, the human user rarely 
has a concrete sense of the reason or mechanism of certain results or what inputs they follow. 
The task left to the social scientist, cultural theorist, philosopher, legal scholar and critical 
theorist is asking what would count as ‘cracking open’ these AI black boxes responsible for so 
much contemporary decision-making — particularly now that society has entered an era of 
computational applications whose success is measured by the capacity of computational 
agents to act on their own. Although involving various arenas of public and academic 
discussion, this question has been most explicitly developed within the interdisciplinary 
scholarly debate about the politics and governance of algorithms (see, for instance, Amoore, 
2020; Ananny and Crawford, 2018; Beer, 2018; Benjamin, 2019; Noble, 2018; O’Neil, 2016; 
Pasquale, 2015). It is impossible to review these rich discussions in full here: suffice it to say, 
however, that there is consensus on the fact that automated cognitive agents processing 
increasingly vaster amounts of data will play ever more significant roles in regulating and 
directing our lives. What academia and the general public alike are asking for is transparency 
regarding how security, government, media, retail, finance, science and industry employ AI on 
a daily basis, often to influence human action. Explainability is a key word for present and 
future algorithmic cultures, raising equally unique social and ethical challenges. 
 
A Different Kind of Abstraction 
 
From the perspective of this article’s engagement with computational operations supposedly 
beyond human knowledge, both the notion of and debate about explainable AI (XAI) are 
significant and relevant, as they call for the opaque powers of AI to be leashed in the realm of 
observation so that the mysteries of machine learning eventually surface. I am not referring 
                                               
9 The concept of agency is not antithetical to that of automation: something automated, such 
as a computational process, can have agency if we take the term to mean the capacity to 
produce a particular effect and understand automation as not synonymous with automatism. 
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here to the visual form of machine learning (i.e. to how data and data patterns can be made 
visible thanks to specialised graphics showing something about how a machine-learning 
algorithm’s output relates to its inputs — see, for instance, how this is discussed in Mackenzie, 
2015). Rather, I am gesturing towards the more figurative sense in which technoscience and 
technoculture are addressing the possibility to present (or re-present) algorithmic operations 
to the human mind and thus make the abstractive operations of artificial cognitive agents (and 
their internal representations) somehow available to and comprehensible within the epistemic 
landscape of human cognitive representation. 
 Interestingly, in her sociocultural study of machine-learning algorithms, the information 
scholar Jenna Burrell distinguished between three types of opacity: (1) opacity as corporate or 
state secrecy (i.e. algorithms as proprietary, their lack of transparency a form of institutional 
protection to maintain trade secrets and competitive advantage); (2) opacity as technical 
illiteracy (i.e. writing and reading code as highly technical skills that require specialised 
knowledge and are thus inaccessible to most people); and (3) opacity as an inherent 
characteristic of machine-learning techniques — that is, ‘opacity that stems from the mismatch 
between mathematical optimization in high-dimensionality characteristic of machine learning 
and the demands of human-scale reasoning and styles of semantic interpretation’ (2016: 2). 
The debate on explainability in AI concerns all three types of opacity, but the last one, which 
pertains to specific techniques used in machine learning, is the most conceptually challenging. 
This is a form of opacity that, in the case of deep-learning systems, thrives upon the complexity 
of their high-dimensional domains — a complexity for which a machine might build model but 
a human most likely cannot hand-engineer one. Technically speaking, the crux of the problem 
of explainability in deep learning lies in artificial neural networks not returning clear 
representations of their inner workings to programmers. Deep neural networks lack model 
interpretability, so when considering why a machine made a particular decision or one 
prediction instead of another, we remain ignorant at worst and agnostic at best. Returning, for 
instance, to the case of DeepMind and its AlphaGo machines, to understand how and why 
AlphaGo or AlphaGo Zero chose a particular move instead of another, the justification given 
by the program may consist of a rendition of the network’s weighted connections and how 
these pass their outcomes to the next layer in the neural network. Of course, this might not 
signify much to a human user, for the calculation the neural network carries out cannot be 
easily performed by a human mind. Even if this performance were possible, however, it might 
be objected that merely rendering the calculation would hardly count as a meaningful form of 
understanding.10 
 This issue links to another open question about when and why an explanation might 
be considered useful and successful or not. I discussed earlier how establishing a theoretical 
ground for deep learning could help programmers interpret the choices a deep neural network 
makes and thus validate its behaviour. Here, however, it should be added that, alongside 
explorations of deep learning’s mathematical foundations, the growing field of XAI focuses on 
the taxonomies of desiderata and of methods for interpreting AI systems. Research in XAI 
often explicitly looks for pragmatic approaches to human-readable explanations that can meet 
the expectations of end-users, whether they are medical doctors and patients in an automated 
diagnosis scenario or banks and their customers agreeing on a mortgage assessment. 
Questions about the nature and characteristics of a successful explanation are thus also 
answered by considering the social dimension of interpretability, and they must confront the 
fact that, when attempting to produce knowledge about a deep-learning system’s input-output 
relationship and the aggregate behaviour of its decision structure, ‘we may not even have the 
                                               
10 Understanding and explanation are key concepts in epistemology and central topics in 
debates about scientific knowledge. Some views take understanding to be a psychological 
process involving the cognitive ability to explain; other positions instead argue that 
understanding is not necessarily explanatory. See Khalifa (2017). 
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words to express the concepts that some parts of the model represent’ (Spreeuwenberg, 2019: 
32). 
 In this respect, deep learning may be changing the epistemic possibilities of justification 
and explanation, effectively reshaping how science imparts information and knowledge. My 
claim, however, is that deep learning is changing the meaning, scope and use of abstractions 
as well. To expand on this point, it is useful to distinguish between the modus operandi of the 
traditional statistics community and the machine-learning community, which the statistician Leo 
Breiman (2001) elaborates on in a much-cited paper. Breiman speaks of ‘two cultures’ to 
explain this distinction: on the one hand, traditional statistics assumes that data models are 
the best way to solve problems; on the other, scientists working with machine learning believe 
that algorithmic models can do better. Breiman’s paper attempted to show that the data models 
of statistics are not applicable to a wide range of problems, so statisticians should allow a wider 
variety of tools to be employed in their discipline. Breiman himself is a pioneering scholar who 
helped bridge the gap between computer science and statistics, writing and working when 
machine-learning techniques were still underexplored in statistical science. 
 In what follows, rather than lingering on Breiman’s advocacy for machine learning, I 
focus on how his paper addressed black boxes. From a scientific perspective, Breiman argued, 
nature is a black box: the challenge is to extract information on how nature associates input 
variables to output variables and to produce predictions about these input-output relations. 
Data are what scientists handle to consider precisely these tasks, and models are what 
scientists use to draw conclusions from data to produce these descriptions. The relationship 
between data and models, however, is different in statistics and computer science. Breiman 
explained that, traditionally, the purpose of statistics is to produce an understandable picture 
of the relationship between the input variables and the end results in the phenomenon or 
situation observed. Of course, nature is overwhelmingly complex and rich with variables; 
statistics hopes to achieve, at best, accurate representational approximations, in which a data 
model is as close as possible to represent, and thus explain, the black boxes of nature. The 
development of algorithmic methods of statistical analysis, however, involved doing things 
differently. The black box of nature remains an unknown whose underlying workings are not 
the target of scientific enquiry. The aim of algorithmic models is not to find the ‘true’ data-
generating mechanism but to use an algorithm to account for that mechanism as well as 
possible. In this sense, computer science is less concerned with explanation than with 
predictive accuracy, and modelling is treated as a problem of function optimisation. ‘The goal 
is not interpretability, but accurate information’ (Breiman, 2001: 201). 
 Breiman’s argument, of course, is not the only reconstruction of the field of machine-
learning research. However, drawing from Breiman's account, one can begin to explain how 
and why, thanks to the contemporary availability of high computing power and of vast amounts 
of data, previously undetected or underrated differences between explanation and prediction 
have moved to the fore of scientific practices, such as statistics.11 Moreover, the difference 
between explanation and prediction highlighted in Breiman’s paper also speaks about what 
abstraction is — or can become — in algorithmic modelling. Following Breiman, we could say 
that statisticians want interpretable approximations of what they hypothesise happening in the 
elusive black boxes of nature. In this sense, they use data to abstract away a model.12 In fact, 
according to Breiman, statistics ends up focusing more on the model than on the problem or 
the data themselves. Pushing Breiman’s comments further, we could also argue that 
abstractive procedures work differently in algorithmic modelling, which seems to acknowledge 
that human abstraction might never be a particularly accurate predictor. Rather than 
description, then, construction is the epistemic tool of choice: instead of reducing a black box 
                                               
11 For explanatory and predictive modelling in statistics, see Shmueli (2010). 
12 I am here hinting to the etymological origin of the term ‘abstraction’, which lies in the Latin 
verb abstrahere, meaning ‘to draw away’. 
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to fit a simpler model, the algorithmic modelling of machine learning constructs and stands as 
another black box, thus freeing abstraction from its reductionist role as a means of 
simplification and description. Abstractive operations of classification and generalisation have 
overcome the boundaries of the human mind and are performed via the weights of digital 
triggers in artificial neural networks. Algorithmic modelling, consequently, is not a means of 
interpreting but rather constructing new, complex worlds in equally new, complex 
computational ways. In her book on models and simulations, the philosopher Margaret 
Morrison observed that scientific inquiry ‘involves reconstructing or recasting nature in a 
specific form and investigating how it behaves or might behave under certain circumstances.’ 
‘Although we can use mathematics to do this,’ Morrison continued, ‘the notion of 
“reconstruction” can also be instantiated in other ways’ (2015: 2). The operational black boxes 
of machine learning also seem to be one of these other ways, according to which 
epistemological reconstruction assumes a life of its own via algorithmic models that do not aim 
to represent and thus do not wish to explain. 
 
Incommensurability 
 
Possibly due to much scientific research in deep learning focusing (quite successfully) on 
computer vision, metaphors or analogies that refer to the sense of sight are frequently used to 
describe the operations of deep neural networks. So, for instance, it is often said that these 
artificial cognitive agents ‘see’ visual inputs differently.13 In light of what I have discussed so 
far, however, I claim that deep learning not only involves a distinctive type of sensibility (i.e. a 
different capacity to receive data inputs) but also concerns a specifically computational relation 
with the intelligible (i.e. with what is apprehensible only through forms of abstractive activity). 
 To exemplify this claim, let us consider machine learning’s increasing ability to 
recognise human handwriting. This is something notoriously hard to perform computationally 
and for which more traditional programming techniques do not work well because it is difficult 
to prefigure and then encode an instruction that would formally describe such a task. In other 
words, relatively simple, immediate human intuitions of how to identify shapes are not easily 
expressed in computational terms. With deep learning, however, the situation changes.14 Let 
us assume that we want a program to recognise a handwritten digit, such as zero. In the case 
of supervised learning, 15 thousands of scans of handwritten zeros are fed to the machine as 
training examples. The program then learns to recognise the digit, not how a human might 
(e.g. determining that a zero resembles a vertical oval), but by mechanically detecting complex 
patterns of darker and lighter pixels expressed as matrices of numbers. This is arguably a 
different form of perception (or of input reception), and ground-breaking research on how a 
computational system can elaborate visual information that humans cannot even receive or 
                                               
13  This is true for the technoscientific literature on the topic but also for technocultural 
engagements in the field of media and software studies. Adrian Mackenzie and Anna Munster 
(2019), for example, have proposed the notion of ‘platform seeing’ to describe the 
computational operationalisation of a new mode of observing. 
14 LeCun, Bottou, Bengio and Haffner (1998a) presented one of the most influential cases for 
the introduction of neural networks to recognise handwritten characters. 
15 In supervised learning, algorithms process labelled datasets; while the inner relations of 
these data might be unknown, the needed output is known: ‘the goal is to learn a function that 
maps from a set of input attributes for an instance to an accurate estimate of the missing value 
for the target attribute of the same instance’ (Kelleher, 2019: 255). In unsupervised learning, 
instead, there is no target attribute or predefined output. ‘The aim . . . is to find the regularities 
of the input’ (Alpaydin, 2016: 111). The neural network attempts to find structure in the data by 
extracting useful features and analysing them. 
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perceive is being developed in the field of computer vision.16 The point here, however, is that 
beyond physical data reception, we are also witnessing a specific form of abstractive capacity 
– one akin to an automated mode of conceptualisation, that is, an automated mode of forming 
internal representations meant to generalise while abstracting from observed facts or 
phenomena. In the case of deep learning, the possibility of concept formation must be 
understood vis-à-vis the machine’s automated feature extraction from raw data. ‘Features’ are 
the properties and characteristics of data that the system learns to distinguish and organise in 
order to recognise patterns, make predictions and classify tasks: deep neural networks are 
algorithms for classification from features, and deep learning is largely feature learning. 
 None of this implies that feature learning and conceptualisation are identical. I am 
addressing the two operations together, however, insofar as I am considering the possibility of 
algorithmic thought and how abstraction qua generalisation is a key operation in the respective 
‘thinking’ structures of both humans and machines.17 The key point is that these abstractive 
operations remain specific to the onto-epistemological grounds of humans, on the one hand, 
and machines, on the other — thus informing human modes of thought as well as algorithmic 
ones. For instance, returning to the case of the algorithmic recognition of handwritten zeros, 
the deep-learning model identifies and constructs representations that are more relevant than 
those that any human programmer could have identified and given to the machine. In fact, 
these are representations that a human would have not (and could have not) abstracted in the 
first place. The way the program extracts and organises information in terms of features and 
then generalises this information to form the desired ‘concept’ — or, in computational terms, 
the desired output representation of zero — is thus entirely and exclusively computational.18 
 We therefore must be careful when addressing how a human receives and elaborates 
stimuli or information, on the one hand, and how, on the other, a computing machine might 
also be said to do the same. It is important to talk here of incommensurability between the 
abstractive choices of humans and those of computing machines. ‘Incommensurability’ is the 
right word because the two cannot be measured against each other or compared by a common 
standard. Considering such an incommensurable dimension is particularly relevant in the 
context of debates about XAI because it allows us to highlight how explainability is a 
representational problem that pertains to communication. For abstractions to be successfully 
represented and thus expressed and shared, a common experience between the 
communicator and the receiver of the communication must be in place. Of course, this is not 
                                               
16 See, for instance, research by Torralba and Freeman (2014). 
17 In Geirhos et al. (2018), both human intelligence and machine intelligence are described as 
grounded in the power of generalisation that belongs equally to biological and artificial neural 
networks. In cognitive psychology, generalisation is understood as the basis of the process of 
learning from experience. In the literature on deep learning, generalisation is addressed in 
terms of the capacity of a model to learn from given data and then apply that information to 
other data. 
18  Deep learning’s artificial neurons respond to simple shapes and then more complex 
structures until they can address highly abstract concepts. Alpaydin explained that ‘starting 
from the raw input, each hidden layer combines the values in its preceding layer and learns 
more complicated functions of the input. . . . Successive layers correspond to more abstract 
representations until we get to the final layer where the inputs are learned in terms of the most 
abstract concepts’ (2016: 104). ‘In deep learning,’ Alpaydin continued, ‘the idea is to learn 
feature levels of increasing abstraction with minimum human contribution . . . because in most 
applications, we do not know what structure there is in the input, especially as we go up, and 
the corresponding concepts become “hidden.” . . . It is this extraction of hidden dependencies, 
or patterns, or regularities from data that allows abstraction and learning general descriptions’ 
(2016: 106). 
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possible in the case of human-machine interactions, for no common phenomenological or 
existential ground exists between human abstractions and those of a computational agent. The 
specificity of computational abstraction and its suitability as the grounds of studying algorithmic 
thought are thus not claims strictly about cognitive science, as they do not emphasise the 
cognitive similarities and differences between abstractions by humans and machines. Rather, 
I stress the difficulty of comparing human and machine abstractive operations when ontological 
grounds shift and epistemic possibilities consequently vary. Acknowledging an 
incommensurability between how humans and machines build models involves recognising 
this ontological and epistemological disparity between how humans and computational agents 
make decisions. Inevitably, this discrepancy is mirrored in how such decisions might be 
respectively recounted or represented by humans and artificial algorithmic agents. 
 Originating in ancient Greek mathematics, the notion of incommensurability denotes 
the absence of a common unit of measurement between two magnitudes. The development 
of this concept drove the distinction between geometry and arithmetic and is also central to the 
study of the ratios of numbers. Outside mathematics, however, the notion of 
incommensurability is used to denote that for which no shared nomenclature or shared ground 
for evaluation exists. In this sense, incommensurability is a key concept in 20th-century 
philosophy of science. Turning to this disciplinary context, in 1962 the philosophers of science 
Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend independently (but equally influentially) argued that 
successive scientific theories (with their associated concepts, methods and worldviews) are 
incommensurable.19 For Feyerabend (1962), incommensurability was a semantic issue which 
he addressed to challenge conceptual conservatism in science and the approach to 
explanation, reduction and scientific advancement employed by logical positivism. In Kuhn’s 
historical philosophy of science, too, incommensurability was a problem of language; for Kuhn 
(1962) as well, and to quote Michael Polanyi (whose philosophical work on the practice of 
science influenced both Kuhn and Feyerabend), scientists from diverse schools of thought and 
periods in time ‘think differently, speak a different language, live in a different world’ (Polanyi, 
1958: 151). Beyond semantics, however, incommensurability was also a methodological and 
perceptual issue and a problem in taxonomy for Kuhn. He described as incommensurable the 
stark contrast between theoretical frameworks for which not only nomenclatures do not overlap 
but also for which no shared perceptions, methods or classifications exist. 
 In the philosophy of science, the notion of incommensurability is controversial; its 
meaning and usefulness are often contested, and discussions on this topic are never fully 
resolved.20 I do not chronicle these discussions and their consequences here. Nonetheless, it 
is valuable to consider how the incommensurable has been introduced and addressed in that 
philosophical context and tradition of thought: this is because those debates help us situate 
incommensurability conceptually and, most importantly, because both Kuhn and Feyerabend 
proposed the concept while assessing the epistemic possibilities of scientific explanation. 
Precisely in relation to explanation, then, the notion of incommensurability confirms that 
explainability — in AI research as elsewhere — is a representational and communicational 
issue. Obviously, language plays a central role in this. Perhaps, to an extent, humans are 
bound to relate to what they cannot represent or communicate with metaphors and analogies 
from their own experiences. So, for instance, we say that a computing machine ‘sees’, ‘listens’ 
                                               
19 In this article, I can only briefly mention some differences between Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s 
positions, which should not be conflated. The use and meaning of the concept of 
incommensurability also continued to evolve throughout both Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s 
scholarship. 
20 For an overview of ‘the incommensurability thesis’, see Sankey (1994, 1997). Issues of 
scientific change and theory comparison are also addressed in Soler, Sankey and Hoyningen-
Huene (2008). 
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or ‘thinks’, just as we say that an aeroplane ‘flies’ despite our awareness that an aircraft and a 
bird take flights in profoundly different ways.21 In this respect, however, the challenge for both 
the philosophical and sociocultural studies of computational automation is to find or found the 
epistemological means to theorise, as well as possible, the incommensurable orders of 
intelligibility and sensibility that automated computational agents produce. Inevitably, the 
notion of incommensurability to be developed must transcend that proposed in the history of 
the philosophy of science: the long-term goal is not to apply Kuhn’s or Feyerabend’s respective 
understandings of the incommensurable to computational media and computational culture but 
to develop a radical version of the concept to address the specificities of human and algorithmic 
modes of abstraction. 
 
‘Upon Opening the Black Box’ 
 
To address this challenge, deep learning offers a particularly relevant case study. In the words 
of Yoshua Bengio, deep-learning research focuses on ‘learning algorithms that discover 
multiple levels of distributed representations, with higher levels representing more abstract 
concepts’ (2013: 1). ‘A deep learning algorithm’, Bengio continues, ‘is a particular kind of 
representation learning procedure that discovers multiple levels of representation, with higher-
level features representing more abstract aspects of the data’ (2013: 2). While much of 
computer programming has historically consisted in making human abstraction significant and 
operative within the instrumental remit of algorithmic machines, with deep learning we face the 
opposite case: the abstractions and consequent instructions the machine gives itself now 
require interpretation for them to be significant and operative for humans. The modes of 
organisation, categorisation and classification that belong to the abstractive operations of 
these computational cognitive agents are indeed incommensurable. Maintaining a theoretical 
focus on the nature and possibilities of abstraction as the balance moves between autonomy 
and automation within AI thus involves acknowledging and working with the prospect of modes 
of abstracting that might arise within calculation but also surpass the boundaries of human 
cognitive representation. In the example of recognising human handwriting, the ‘autonomy of 
automation’ (Fazi, 2019b: 94) regarding abstractive operations is demonstrated by a deep 
learning system producing internal representations independently from the phenomenological 
or experiential ground of the human programmer. Returning to this article’s opening example 
of AlphaGo Zero, such an autonomy is doubled: not only the outputs but also the training inputs 
are somewhat independent from human knowledge. DeepMind’s description of AlphaGo Zero 
as a form of superhuman intelligence is thus misleading; it would be more appropriate, from 
the point of view of incommensurability, to speak of non-human or inhuman intelligence (and 
the term ‘intelligence’ itself should also be problematised according to comparative 
epistemology). 
 Deep learning demonstrates that, when thinking and talking of computational cognitive 
agents, our theoretical efforts should attempt to move from strictly phenomenological analyses 
and existential qualifications (i.e. from efforts to address objects and situations as they appear 
to or are understood by human consciousness and through categories of human life and 
experience) towards more speculative modes of investigation. Adopting a speculative mode of 
investigation, we should address the critical prospect of understanding what explanation and 
interpretation might be in the formalising space of computation. Key to this speculative effort 
in relation to the study of computational automation is the possibility of constructing a theory 
of knowledge specific to computational artificial agents — a theory that can be advanced only 
by assessing the ontological and epistemological possibilities of machines. This theory would 
be valuable not only within the remit of digital studies but also for philosophical investigations 
                                               
21 ‘The quest for “artificial flight” succeeded when the Wright brothers and others stopped 
imitating birds and started . . . learning about aerodynamics’ (Russell and Norvig, 2010: 3). 
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of the relation between abstraction and experience and, consequently, the relation between 
rationality and the world. The following valuable programmatic point can then be drawn from 
the incommensurability debate in the philosophy of science. Both Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s 
understandings of incommensurability have been accused of denying the possibility of 
progress and truth in science and thus implying irrationality.22 This accusation, however, was 
rebutted by both scholars: claims about incommensurability do not imply that comparison is 
not possible but that it is much more difficult than the logical positivism and logical empiricism 
of the time assumed it was. Both Kuhn and Feyerabend made the notion of the 
incommensurable a powerful weapon in their post-positivist arsenals, and they used it to 
challenge evaluation and explanation based on absolute universal criteria or a neutral 
observation language. 
 Although differences certainly exist between the contexts and the aims of that debate 
— which pertained to the possibility of theory comparison — and the present study on deep 
learning and explainability, I propose that we can also mobilise the concept of 
incommensurability to problematise the twenty-first-century (implicit or explicit) positivist 
approaches to computational culture and society via data science.23 Doing so does not imply 
relativism but, in fact, quite the opposite: I am arguing for the need to be loyal to the specificities 
of humans and machines in our comparisons. Similarly, we should not take for granted the fact 
that, when dealing with computing machines’ abstractions that transcend the epistemic 
boundaries of human cognitive representation, we are working with models that are, at this 
time, both within and beyond logos. In other words, these models are logical because they are 
computational and thus based on the possibility of a formal, logico-mathematical account of 
calculation; however, in a different sense, they are also a-logical because they are, at present, 
inexpressible or unrepresentable by humans (where ‘logos’, according to its ancient Greek 
etymology, not only means ‘reason’ or ‘proportion’ but also ‘word’, ‘discourse’, ‘speech’, and 
derives from the verb légō, ‘to count’, ‘to tell’, ‘to speak’). Focusing on the notion of 
incommensurability, then, allows us to emphasise the paradoxical condition of logico-
mathematical abstraction in computation, which despite being a key tool for human attempts 
to organise and make sense of reality, today also surpasses that human-centric instrumental 
horizon with its AI implementations. For these AI-native models to be held rationally 
accountable, we should first ask whose and what rationality we are discussing. This question 
is radically open and acknowledges that a comparison between kinds and modes of thought 
is, to an extent, necessary to study AI’s ‘thinking’ procedures. The use of terms such as 
‘thinking’ and ‘intelligence’ (which originated in human epistemology) does not contradict my 
argument; rather, their use confirms the inevitability of a comparison, although a comparison 
that will always be incomplete and partial because humans, as observers and interpreters, can 
only offer epistemic representations that have been shaped within their own ontological 
domain. 
 In this respect, it must be highlighted that incommensurability is a translation failure: on 
the one hand, a satisfactory translation between incommensurable entities is difficult or even 
impossible; on the other, a ‘translation failure’ also signals the limits of approaching explainable 
AI by searching for the quality or propriety of being translatable. It is important to stress this 
vis-à-vis current issues in the contemporary quest for fair, accountable, transparent AI 
precisely because that quest appears to be predicated on research that understands 
                                               
22 ‘My critics respond to my views on this subject with charges of irrationality, relativism, and 
the defense of mob rule. These are all labels which I categorically reject, even when they are 
used in my defense by Feyerabend. To say that, in matters of theory choice, the force of logic 
and observation cannot in principle be compelling is neither to discard logic and observation 
nor to suggest that they are not good reasons for favoring one theory over another’ (Kuhn, 
2000a: 126). 
23 I have discussed data science’s positivist inclinations in Fazi (2017). 
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interpretability in terms of translation. It is thus also useful to consider how Kuhn (2000b) 
attributed the equation between translation and interpretation to the analytic tradition of 
philosophy. This equation was, in his opinion, misleading: incommensurability does not mean 
that a theoretical term, for instance, cannot be interpreted (that is, be made intelligible); rather, 
it means that it cannot be translated, as it has no equivalent in another theoretical language. 
 Returning to debates in and on XAI, such an equation between interpretation and 
translation can be observed in research that promotes the advancement of future XAI systems  
by developing new techniques able to produce interpretable models of machine-learning 
operations; these models, in turn, are paired with interfaces to advance useful human-machine 
translations, thus generating meaningful explanatory dialogues for end users. Interpretability 
via human-machine translation is, for instance, the explicit goal of the Defense Advanced 
Research Project Agency’s (DARPA) XAI initiative, which — recognising explainability as a 
real issue for the computational systems of today and tomorrow — aims to develop human-
centric perspectives in the design of artificial cognitive agents.24 The challenge, for DARPA 
and other parties involved in the quest for interpretability in AI,25 is to achieve understanding 
without compromising the predictive power and overall learning performance of the 
computational system. To do so, DARPA’s XAI initiative encompasses various projects ranging 
from the design of entirely new kinds of deep neural networks comprising smaller and hence 
more easily understood modules to the borrowing of insights from the psychology of human 
expertise and decision-making. 
 What observations can be advanced about DARPA’s XAI in relation to the issue of 
incommensurability? First, consistent with similar technoscientific attempts, DARPA’s quest for 
XAI aims to bring what is beyond human knowledge back into the domain of human cognitive 
representation. Second, the goal of DARPA’s XAI project is to find meaningful representations 
of the machine’s own abstractions, even though these representations might be only useful or 
valuable to human actors and not, strictly speaking, necessary for the operativity of machine 
agency itself. Noticeably, there is not yet an obvious way of designing an artificial 
computational system that can explain itself, just as there is no consensus on what that 
explanation should look like — that is, what such an explanation should aim to represent. Third, 
then, the following question must be answered: would giving enough speculative credit and 
attention to the incommensurable operations of artificial cognitive systems be enough to 
produce such a shared account of a useful, successful explanation? 
 This question constitutes my conclusion; I leave it open to future research on the topic, 
which would have to further problematise the possibility of explanation in AI precisely because 
the opportunity of direct human-machine translations for artificial cognitive systems that are de 
facto beyond human representation can be questioned via the notion of incommensurability. 
In a famous polemical essay, Langdon Winner (1993) criticised imperatives of ‘opening the 
black box’ being obeyed, in his opinion, by the social construction of technology. Winner noted 
that, ‘upon opening the black box’, the risk was of ‘finding it empty’. In a parallel yet distinct 
sense, we can borrow Winner’s famous expression to consider now whether contemporary 
XAI’s imperatives of opening the black box are running a similar risk. If there is indeed such a 
risk, it is less of finding the black box empty but of realising that there is nothing to translate or 
                                               
24  The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is the United States 
Department of Defense’s body responsible for research and development projects in 
technology and science for use by the military. 
25 From a legislative perspective, it can be mentioned how the European Union (EU) has 
declared that EU citizens can challenge legal (or equally significant) decisions made by 
algorithms and appeal for human intervention and interpretation. This piece of legislation is 
part of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that went into effect in May 2018 and 
sketches the contours of a ‘right to explanation’. 
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to render precisely because the possibility of human representation never existed in the first 
place. 
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